A standard form of citation of this article is:
Ozertan, Gokhan and Cevik, Baris (2008). 'Pricing Strategies and Protection of Digital Products Under Presence of Piracy: A Welfare Analysis'. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 11(4)1 <https://www.jasss.org/11/4/1.html>.
The following can be copied and pasted into a Bibtex bibliography file, for use with the LaTeX text processor:
@article{ozertan2008,
title = {Pricing Strategies and Protection of Digital Products Under Presence of Piracy: A Welfare Analysis},
author = {Ozertan, Gokhan and Cevik, Baris},
journal = {Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation},
ISSN = {1460-7425},
volume = {11},
number = {4},
pages = {1},
year = {2008},
URL = {https://www.jasss.org/11/4/1.html},
keywords = {Duopoly, Monitoring, Pricing Strategy, Software Piracy},
abstract = {Based on a duopolistic set-up where firms produce software products with respective support packs, we analyze firms' predetermined monitoring and their pricing decisions, as well as the impacts of these factors on welfare. Under presence of end-user piracy, users are classified as support-dependent and support-independent. First, a theoretical model is derived, but, due to its complexity, a numerical example is employed to derive the results. We observe that firms that are in competition face a menu of monitoring and pricing combinations. Our results indicate that (i) firms may use monitoring and pricing as strategic complements, rather than substitutes, (ii) profits are not necessarily an increasing function of both monitoring rates and prices, and welfare improvement from the lowest set of monitoring and pricing levels is possible, (iii) firms may prefer improvement in software rather than support packs, targeting especially the support-independent users.},
}The following can be copied and pasted into a text file, which can then be imported into a reference database that supports imports using the RIS format, such as Reference Manager and EndNote.
TY - JOUR
TI - Pricing Strategies and Protection of Digital Products Under Presence of Piracy: A Welfare Analysis
AU - Ozertan, Gokhan
AU - Cevik, Baris
Y1 - 2008/10/31
JO - Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
SN - 1460-7425
VL - 11
IS - 4
SP - 1
UR - https://www.jasss.org/11/4/1.html
KW - Duopoly
KW - Monitoring
KW - Pricing Strategy
KW - Software Piracy
N2 - Based on a duopolistic set-up where firms produce software products with respective support packs, we analyze firms' predetermined monitoring and their pricing decisions, as well as the impacts of these factors on welfare. Under presence of end-user piracy, users are classified as support-dependent and support-independent. First, a theoretical model is derived, but, due to its complexity, a numerical example is employed to derive the results. We observe that firms that are in competition face a menu of monitoring and pricing combinations. Our results indicate that (i) firms may use monitoring and pricing as strategic complements, rather than substitutes, (ii) profits are not necessarily an increasing function of both monitoring rates and prices, and welfare improvement from the lowest set of monitoring and pricing levels is possible, (iii) firms may prefer improvement in software rather than support packs, targeting especially the support-independent users.
ER -