A standard form of citation of this article is:
Janssen, Marco (2006). 'Evolution of Cooperation when Feedback to Reputation Scores is Voluntary'. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9(1)17 <https://www.jasss.org/9/1/17.html>.
The following can be copied and pasted into a Bibtex bibliography file, for use with the LaTeX text processor:
@article{janssen2006,
title = {Evolution of Cooperation when Feedback to Reputation Scores is Voluntary},
author = {Janssen, Marco},
journal = {Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation},
ISSN = {1460-7425},
volume = {9},
number = {1},
pages = {17},
year = {2006},
URL = {https://www.jasss.org/9/1/17.html},
keywords = {Trust, Reputation, One-Shot Prisoner Dilemma, Voluntary Feedback, Symbols},
abstract = {Reputation systems are used to facilitate interaction between strangers in one-shot social dilemmas, like transactions in e-commerce. The functioning of various reputation systems depend on voluntary feedback derived from the participants in those social dilemmas. In this paper a model is presented under which frequencies of providing feedback to positive and negative experiences in reputation systems explain observed levels of cooperation. The results from simulations show that it is not likely that reputation scores alone will lead to high levels of cooperation.},
}The following can be copied and pasted into a text file, which can then be imported into a reference database that supports imports using the RIS format, such as Reference Manager and EndNote.
TY - JOUR
TI - Evolution of Cooperation when Feedback to Reputation Scores is Voluntary
AU - Janssen, Marco
Y1 - 2006/01/31
JO - Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
SN - 1460-7425
VL - 9
IS - 1
SP - 17
UR - https://www.jasss.org/9/1/17.html
KW - Trust
KW - Reputation
KW - One-Shot Prisoner Dilemma
KW - Voluntary Feedback
KW - Symbols
N2 - Reputation systems are used to facilitate interaction between strangers in one-shot social dilemmas, like transactions in e-commerce. The functioning of various reputation systems depend on voluntary feedback derived from the participants in those social dilemmas. In this paper a model is presented under which frequencies of providing feedback to positive and negative experiences in reputation systems explain observed levels of cooperation. The results from simulations show that it is not likely that reputation scores alone will lead to high levels of cooperation.
ER -