Citing this article

A standard form of citation of this article is:

Chavalarias, David (2006). 'Metamimetic Games: Modeling Metadynamics in Social Cognition'. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9(2)5 <https://www.jasss.org/9/2/5.html>.

The following can be copied and pasted into a Bibtex bibliography file, for use with the LaTeX text processor:

@article{chavalarias2006,
   title = {Metamimetic Games:  Modeling Metadynamics in Social Cognition},
   author = {Chavalarias, David},
   journal = {Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation},
   ISSN = {1460-7425},
   volume = {9},
   number = {2},
   pages = {5},
   year = {2006},
   URL = {https://www.jasss.org/9/2/5.html},
   keywords = {Social Cognition, Imitation, Cultural Co-Evolution, Differentiation, Reflexivity, Metacognition, Stochastic Game Theory, Endogenous Distributions, Metamimetic Games, Counterfactual Equilibrium},
   abstract = {Imitation is fundamental in the understanding of social systems' dynamics. But the diversity of imitation rules employed by modelers proves that the modeling of mimetic processes cannot avoid the traditional problem of endogenization of all the choices, including the one of the mimetic rules. Starting from the remark that metacognition and human reflexive capacities are the ground for a new class of mimetic rules, we propose a formal framework, metamimetic games, that enables to endogenize the distribution of imitation rules while being human specific. The corresponding concepts of equilibrium &mdash; counterfactually stable state &mdash; and attractor are introduced. Finally, we give an interpretation of social differenciation in terms of cultural co-evolution among a set of possible motivations, which departs from the traditional view of optimization indexed to immutable criteria that exist prior to the activity of agents.},
}

The following can be copied and pasted into a text file, which can then be imported into a reference database that supports imports using the RIS format, such as Reference Manager and EndNote.


TY  - JOUR
TI  - Metamimetic Games:  Modeling Metadynamics in Social Cognition
AU  - Chavalarias, David
Y1  - 2006/03/31
JO  - Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
SN  - 1460-7425
VL  - 9
IS  - 2
SP  - 5
UR  - https://www.jasss.org/9/2/5.html
KW  - Social Cognition
KW  - Imitation
KW  - Cultural Co-Evolution
KW  - Differentiation
KW  - Reflexivity
KW  - Metacognition
KW  - Stochastic Game Theory
KW  - Endogenous Distributions
KW  - Metamimetic Games
KW  - Counterfactual Equilibrium
N2  - Imitation is fundamental in the understanding of social systems' dynamics. But the diversity of imitation rules employed by modelers proves that the modeling of mimetic processes cannot avoid the traditional problem of endogenization of all the choices, including the one of the mimetic rules. Starting from the remark that metacognition and human reflexive capacities are the ground for a new class of mimetic rules, we propose a formal framework, metamimetic games, that enables to endogenize the distribution of imitation rules while being human specific. The corresponding concepts of equilibrium &mdash; counterfactually stable state &mdash; and attractor are introduced. Finally, we give an interpretation of social differenciation in terms of cultural co-evolution among a set of possible motivations, which departs from the traditional view of optimization indexed to immutable criteria that exist prior to the activity of agents.
ER  -