Yvonne Haffner and Stefan Gramel (2001)
Modelling Strategies for Water Supply Companies to Deal with Nitrate Pollution
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
vol. 4, no. 3,
To cite articles published in the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, please reference the above information and include paragraph numbers if necessary
<https://www.jasss.org/4/3/11.html>
Received: 29-Jun-01 Published: 301-Jun-01
At present, water supply in Germany suffers mainly from quality problems but also in some regions from quantity problems. In several regions of the country, raw water quality is not satisfactory and is even deteriorating (SRU 1998), due to diffuse emissions mainly from agriculture (e.g. nitrate, pesticides). Elsewhere, there is regional or local water scarcity, as water resources are over-exploited. Regarding both problems, water resource management must be oriented towards greater environmental sustainability.
An important issue in this context is the restructuring of the German water supply system, towards a greater participation of the private sector. The push for privatizating water supply has many reasons: The public sector is seeking opportunities to sell off assets in order to increase its revenues, if only temporarily1 ; water supply is thought to become more efficient, as management expertise of private companies can be utilized; cost reductions due scale economies in private businesses are anticipated, and, as a result, an enhanced competitiveness of the German water industry (e.g. BMWI 2001, Spelthahn 1994). Expectations about the effects of privatization on environmental sustainability are less concrete and more ambiguous (e.g. UBA 2000; Gramel & Haffner 2001; Entelmann et. al. 2000).
Figure 1. Distribution of nitrate concentrations in groundwater samples (LAWA 1995) |
Figure 2. An overview of WATER 1 |
Figure 3. Water supply company with plants |
Figure 4. Attributes of the water supply company |
If the strategy of withdrawing from deeper aquifers ('deeper aquifers') is chosen, the old wells will be replaced by deeper wells. The old wells will be deleted from the list of plants and the deeper wells will be added.
DeeperWells dw = (DeeperWells)sim.repository.getClient("deeper wells");
entity().add(HASINFRASTUCTURE,dw);
Well w = (Well)sim.repository.getClient("wells");
entity().remove(HASINFRASTRUCTURE,w);
sim.repository.delete(w);
If the strategy 'nitrate treatment' is chosen, a nitrate treatment plant will be added to the list of plants.
NitrateTreatmentUnit nt = (NitrateTreatmentUnit)sim.repository.getClient("nitrate treatment");
entity().add(HASINFRASTRUCTURE, nt);
Because a nitrate treatment does not replace the existing water treatment plant, the latter will not be deleted. The use of a nitrate treatment plant requires additional raw material. Therefore the variable costs per cubic meter increases. The variable costs have to be changed.
entity().set(VARIABLE_COSTS, entity().get(VARIABLE_COSTS) + nt.entity().get(NitrateTreatment.OPERATING_COSTS));
If the strategy co-operative agreements is selected, a
contract between water supply company and farmers will be introduced. The
costs of this action are accounted for in another method.
The effect of this measure on nitrate concentrations in groundwater is
delayed because of the time it takes for the emissions to seep through the
unsaturated zone. Accordingly, in the object 'water resource', a method is
called up that calculates and returns this delay. Also, an action is
created which is activated after the delay time and passes the new nitrate
emission on the water resource. The resulting new value can be used to
calculate the nitrate concentration in the groundwater.
this.scheduleIn(water.transportDelay(), false,
new Action("reduceNitrateRecharge", Action.HIGH_PRIORITY)
{
protected void execute()
{
water.initNitrification(coop.entity().get(coop.NO3REDUCTION));
sim.output("Started reducing nitrate recharge."):
}
}
);
double differenz = a.entity().get(a.PROPBOOKVALUE) a.entity().get(a.SECURITYBOOKVALUE);
if (differenz < 0)
{
reinvestment += a.calculateReinvestment(10.0);
}
The reinvestment sum for all plants is given to the bank which produces a credit.
if (reinvest > 0.0)
{
Bank bank = (Bank)sim.repository.getClient("bank");
bank.produceCredit(reinvestment);
}
Figure 5. Co-operation |
c(t) = (c0-crecharge) * e [G * t / (H * nf)]
+ crecharge (Rohmann
et al. 1985)
with:
c recharge: nitrate concentration of the grounwater
recharge [mg NO3/l]
G: quantity of groundwater recharge [l/m2*a]
H: thickness of the aquifer [m]
nf: effective porosity [-]
c0: nitrate concentration at beginning [mg/l]
t: time
c(t): nitrate concentration at time t [mg/l]
In the repository, the user can view the actual nitrate concentration in the groundwater as shown in figure 6.
Figure 6. Water resource |
Dt = nFK * d/GWnew (HMU
1996)
with:
nFK: net field capacity [l/m2]
d: thickness of unsaturated zone [m]
GWnew: quantity of groundwater recharge [l/m2*a]
Dt: transport delay through
unsaturated zone [years]
Figure 7. Nitrate concentration without co-operative agreement |
with:
nitrate concentration of the groundwater recharge: 80
mg/l
quantity of groundwater recharge: 200 l/(m2*a)
thickness of the aquifer: 25 m
effective porosity: 0.35 mg/l
nitrate concentration at the beginning: 10 mg/l
Figure 8. Nitrate concentration with co-operative agreement |
with:
same values as used in the context of figure 7;
Co-operative agreements with agriculture are concluded when the nitrate concentration reaches 40mg/l. The reduction of nitrate emission amounts to 25% - i.e. to 20mg/l.
Figure 9. Bank and credits |
Figure 10. Interest loads |
Figure 11. Costs and proceeds |
Figure 12. Simulation steps of a co-operation model |
Figure 13. Groundwater nitrate concentration depending on the strategy |
Figure 14. Annual total costs under the conditions of different strategies |
1 This has to be seen in the context that
German municipalities are often heavily indebted (e.g.
Nassmacher 1999).
2 50 mg/l NO3 = 11.2 mg/l NO3-N
3 Water-bearing stratum
4 If the layer between the higher nitrate
polluted aquifer and the deeper aquifer is permeable the pollution of the
deeper aquiver is also possible accelerated by the water withdrawal
from the deeper level.
5In fact the process of reinvestment is
more complex. E.g. a water treatment plant consists of various parts with
different useful life expectancies.
6Especially because of the unsaturated zone
and the mixture of the percolating water with the groundwater
7Nitrate concentration of the groundwater
at the beginning: 10 mg/l, nitrate concentration of the recharge without
co-operation: 80 mg/l, nitrate concentration of the recharge with
co-operation: 20 mg/l , groundwater recharge: 150 mm/a, thickness of the
aquifer: 25m, effective porosity 0.35, net field capacity of the soil: 150
l/m², thickness of the unsaturated zone: 10m
8The curves are quite smooth as the annual
total costs e.g. does not show the investment costs of one year but the
distributed costs for the credit during several years.
9Which is exceeded in the year 41
10In the context of this simulation 10
years
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